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SUMMARY 
This chapter represents an analysis, from the standpoint of the sociology of power, of the 
resources of Islamist elites in Algeria, specifically focusing on the three most important 
political parties: FIS, MSP (HAMAS) and en-Nahda between 1990 and 2016. This 
analysis, intentionally excluding armed groups, will try to explain the fundamental 
differences between the former party – a true mass movement – and the other two, which 
are circumscribed by their grassroots support and the circular logic of their relations with 
power. The different origins of their elites, their grassroots supporters and above all their 
political strategy all throw a light on the different paths followed by these three tendencies 
of the Islamist movement. 
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INTRODUCTION  
Under the new president Chadli Bendjedid, who ruled during the 1980s, the 
Islamist movement began to show a strength that is still emerging. One example was the 
mass demonstration of students in Algiers in 1982, which was brought to an end by the 
publication of a 14-point document of Islamist demands. This led to the house arrest of 
Sheikh Abdelatif Soltani, one of the document’s signatories, and who died soon after 
while under arrest. The funerals held for Soltani in 1984 were attended by huge numbers 
of people, which represented another sign of Islamist strength. These two events were 
important moments in terms of the Islamist movement’s visibility and affirmation in 
Algeria. Despite the clandestine work, the earlier years began to bear fruit in the milieu 
of the universities, where Islamist groups started to outnumber left-wing and pro-Berber 
groups.  
                                                 
1 F. Izquierdo, J. Etherington and L. Feliu (eds.), Political Islam in a time of Revolt, 
[2017], Palgrave Macmillan, reproduced with permission of Palgrave Macmillan. This 
extract is taken from the author's original manuscript and has not been edited. The 
definitive, published, version of record is available here:  
https://www.palgrave.com/de/book/9783319528328. 
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The mid-1980s saw an affirmation of Islamist strength in the form of the Bouyali 
terrorist group, the Armed Islamic Group. For several years, this small armed organisation 
perpetrated a number of acts of sabotage against state installations and infrastructures, 
though without causing personal injury. Bouyali, the group’s mastermind, was captured 
and killed in 1987 and his group dissolved, after which Bouyali became a kind of romantic 
hero for Islamism. However, some of his group's members made a reappearance later in 
the early 1990s after the break-up of FIS and the outbreak of hostilities by Islamist 
factions and groups. 
When the Islamists "reappeared" in 1988-89, firstly to take political advantage of 
the people's movement of October 1988 (later known as “les évènements”) and 
subsequently to legalise certain parties, different tendencies and stances already existed 
within the movement. One tendency – as personified by the historical leaders – was 
opposed to following political channels, which they viewed with suspicion and distrust. 
There was also a gradualist tendency that had developed by working with civil society 
through charity and preaching associations, and which requested legalisation after FIS 
came onto the scene (HAMAS and En-Nahda al-Islamiyya). Furthermore, there was a 
populist trend disposed toward taking advantage of the opportunities made available by 
the regime, and which took to the streets in 1988 and led to the launching of the Islamic 
Salvation Front. Finally, there was a tendency that favoured violent action; these were the 
heirs of the Bouyali group, and had learned their lessons from the resources and the 
mistakes made by Bouyali, whom they considered naive and romantic. By way of 
clarification, I should add that the Association of Algerian Muslim Ulema, as such, was 
not involved with any of these tendencies (perhaps with the exception of the anti-political 
one). Admittedly, the Association tried to regain visibility during the "Algeria Spring", 
but it was inevitably eclipsed and overtaken by the dynamism of the new parties, 
especially by FIS. 
Even the “al-yazara versus ad-dawliya or salafiya” debate (that is to say, between 
the "Algerianist" tendency and the "internationalists") had already become entrenched 
when the changes and events of the "Algeria Spring" commenced. Though this split was 
not very well known outside Islamist circles, it has to do with the interpretation of 
Islamism, and specifically the opposition that exists between those who favour a global 
Islamic state (ad-dawliya) headed by a caliphate, and those who support a national Islamic 
state (al-yazara) while respecting national borders and the particularities of the different 
nations. In the eyes of "international" Islamists, all states and their symbols are ungodly, 
in accordance with the activist thoughts of Sayid Qutb and Abu Ala Maududi. Therefore, 
these elements belong to “yahilyia”, or the pre-Islamic age of ignorance, and as such must 
be destroyed and replaced by truly Islamic institutions. In Algeria, this split has tended to 
define itself as the struggle between those who support the line of Sheikh Ben Badis, 
famous ulema of the 1930s (and later the Algerian thinker Malek Bennabi) and those who 
support Wahhabi and other foreign radical Salafite thinkers. 
After the conflict broke out in spring/summer of 1992, a number of armed Islamist 
groups appeared:  MIA, MEI, AIS, FIDA, GIA, GSPC and, finally, al-Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb (AQMI), to name just a few of the most important ones. Though the 
conflict had its origin in the cancellation of the electoral process in which FIS had gained 
a considerable majority in Parliament (January 1992) and the subsequent dissolving of 
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FIS (March 1992), the violence only flared up in the months after these events. Despite 
the fact that 30,000 FIS militants (or 5,000, according to the Army) were arrested and 
held in detention camps in the Sahara, and in spite of the assassination of the president 
Mohamed Boudiaf, political violence did not take hold in the country until late 1992 and 
1993, with the advent of the first armed resistance groups – the MIA (Islamic Armed 
Movement, of Abdelkader Chebouti), whose members had fought with Bouyali and had 
regrouped in 1990, and the MEI (Movement for an Islamic State, of Said Mekhloufi). The 
former was an almost secret elitist guerrilla group that only attacked members of the 
military forces, while the latter favoured outright terrorism (Martínez 2010). 
The armed wing of FIS, the AIS (Islamic Salvation Army), did not take up arms 
until after these factions had appeared, in 1994. After these came others, which attacked 
the state, the resistance groups already in existence (they declared war on the FIS) and 
civil society, and which perpetrated widespread killings and murdered leading figures. 
These factions included FIDA-Islamic Front for Armed Jihad (specialized in killing 
intellectuals) and GIA-Armed Islamic Group (mass killings), and which later produced 
the splinter group GSPC (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat). This group declared 
its loyalty to al-Qaeda in 2003, later becoming a branch of al-Qaeda under the name of 
AQMI in late 2006, though it disappeared as such in January 2007. After the truce (1997) 
and the break-up of AIS (2000), the conflict took a new direction which, from 2001 
onwards, resulted in a significant reduction in violence. Even before the conflict had 
ended, many members of the resistance group surrendered, taking advantage of the 
successive laws on civil concord (1999) and national reconciliation (2005). The violence 
decreased and became restricted to a few mountainous areas in Kabylia, Boumerdés 
(centre) and Jijel (north-east), despite a number of kidnappings and spectacular attacks 
by AQMI in recent years, such as the ones (all in 2007) which targeted the government 
building and the Ministry of the Interior, the headquarters of ACNUR, UNDP and the 
Constitutional Court in the capital city, and an attack on the president of the republic 
himself while visiting the city of Batna. 
However, this chapter does not propose to focus on the political history of the 
conflict or on the violent Islamist groups, as in my view these groups do not represent 
politically important elites today2. This is a view that I share with I. Werenfels who, in 
her excellent study on Algerian elites until 2004, excludes these armed groups 
(specifically, GIA and GSPC) from the main spheres of action of the Algerian elites 
(Werenfelds 2007). In the author's opinion, even though they had previously championed 
political objectives, by the beginning of the first decade of the 21st century, their political 
objectives had become blurred with those of banditry. The same cannot be said of the 
Islamist parties, starting with FIS, which in the early 1990s came close to the central 
nucleus of power, and the leaders of which – either divided or exiled – gave their support 
to Bouteflika in 2004. Neither was this the case with the illegalised Islamist parties (the 
MSP, en Nahda and el-Islah), which occupied intermediary positions of power from the 
mid-1990s until the present, bringing the MSP much closer to the central nucleus of power 
than en-Nahda and, especially, el-Islah. It is these political groups, both legal and illegal, 
which will be the main focus of the chapter, and I will leave the armed groups for an 
auxiliary part of the analysis and political account.  
                                                 
2 On the analysis of elites in the Arabic world and on the Algerian context, see (Izquierdo & Kemou, 2009), and (Bustos & Mañé, 2009). 
4 
 
THE GROUPS’ GRASSROOTS AND BACKGROUND OF THEIR ELITES  
The FIS grassroots support crossed class barriers, as it was a populist party that 
appealed to all sectors of society. Its objective was to correct the mistakes of FLN, its 
parent party (FIS means "child" in French), and to somehow "save" the Algerian umma 
from the dangers that lay ahead; hence the name "Islamic Salvation Front". FIS obtained 
widespread support throughout the country in both the municipal elections of 1990 and 
the state elections of 1991 (first round). The areas where FIS obtained less support were 
the less-populated wilayas (provinces) of the country's interior, many of which were the 
domain of FLN; specifically, these include many of the provinces located on the high 
plateaus (haut plateaux), especially in the east and the south of the country. Nor did FIS 
obtain noteworthy results in Kabylia, where the Socialist Forces Front (FFS) turned out 
to be the main power. The other Islamist parties that took part in the 1991 state elections 
(though not in those held in 1990, as these parties had not yet been created) obtained 
minimal support throughout the country, with the exception of Mahfoud Nahnah’s 
Movement for the Islamic Society (MSI, later MSP) in Blida, and Harakat en-Nahda al-
Islamiyya (at that time led by Sheikh Djaballah) in Constantine and the surrounding 
region.  
Generally speaking, most of the electorate that voted for FIS lived in the urban 
areas along the country's coastal strip (between the Tell mountain range and the sea), 
which is the most densely populated zone. Within this geographical and demographic 
area, the FIS vote was higher among the cities’ poorer sectors, often comprised of 
recently-arrived rural inhabitants who were not entirely accustomed to urban life. This is 
what some sociologists and Gema M. Muñoz have called the phenomenon of the 
“rurbanización” (i.e. "rural urbanisation") of cities (Martín Muñoz 1999). It was these 
de-classed social segments – often young people, not very integrated, in precarious or 
illegal work situations – which constituted the vast majority of FIS voters.  
In contrast, the parties that are legal today – the Movement of Society for Peace 
(MSP) and the en-Nahda movement (currently made up of en-Nahda and el-Islah) possess 
a grassroots support that is more localised geographically. As I have mentioned, these 
parties gained their best results in 1991 in the cities and wilayas where the movement was 
more deeply rooted, as well as being the areas that the parties' leaders were from. In the 
case of MSP-Hamas, this was the city and wilaya of Blida (in the centre of the country, 
some 60 km south of Algiers), which was the birthplace of the party's leader, Mahfoud 
Nahnah; as for en-Nahda al-Islamiyya, it was the eastern city of Constantine (the 
birthplace of its leader, Abdellah Djaballah) and its hinterland. These parties recruited 
their sympathisers and leaders from wealthier classes than those of the FIS grassroots, 
many of which were traders and the middle classes of traditional, medium-sized cities.  
As for the leaders of the three parties, once again we must make a differentiation 
between FIS and the legal parties, en-Nahda e Islah and MSP. It is interesting to note (and 
I do not believe that this has been remarked on previously) that a significant number of 
FIS leaders (especially the most charismatic ones) came from south-east Algeria, a region 
better known for its brotherhoods than for its traditions and Islamic studies, Constantine 
being one of the main cities. This area covers a strip of the high plateaus, the mountains 
of el-Aurès and the edge of the desert, stretching from the south of Batna through the 
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wilayas of el-Oued and Biskra, as well as other provinces on the border with Tunisia. 
Curiously, this is also the area that other members of the Algerian Ulemas Association 
were from, including Sheikh Tayeb el-Oqbi (1890-1960), whose name actually derives 
from the fact that he was a native of Sidi el-Oqba, in the wilaya of Biskra. Meanwhile, 
Sheikh Soltani, a member of AUMA and a leading Islamist figure who died before the 
founding of FIS, was born in el-Qantara (Batna) and studied at Sidi Okba zawiya (Cheurfi 
1996). 
Thus, Abbasi Madani and Ali Benhaj, the number 1 and 2 of FIS, were natives of 
a town in Biskra and Wadi Souf, a town in the wilaya of el-Oued (near the Tunisian 
border), respectively. They had completed higher education, as had many other FIS 
leaders, who included many teachers and engineers who combined their working life with 
their political and religious activities. Madani taught at the University of Algiers, and had 
gained a teaching diploma in the United Kingdom. Abdelkader Hachani, the provisional 
number 1 after the arrest and imprisonment of Madani and Belhaj, was a petrochemical 
engineer. But the fact is that both Madani and Benhadj, just like other FIS leaders in the 
Majlis es-shura, came to work and preach in Algiers, following in the footsteps of Sheikh 
Ahmed Sahnoun. On request of the neighbourhood communities, the latter taught during 
the 1980s and ‘90s in popular mosques in the capital, such as the one in the Kouba district 
and the historic mosque of Ketchoua (Bab el-Oued). It was, in fact, these crowded 
mosques in the capital city where FIS and its leaders before the party’s founding began 
to gain their many sympathisers and future voters. Recordings of preaching and sermons, 
and their subsequent dissemination in cassette and video form, helped the leaders to 
extend their influence to other cities in the country. The Islamic charity associations 
dedicated to different aims such as building mosques, organising the hajj (the pilgrimage 
to Mecca), the protection of Islamic heritage and other aid and charity work began to 
create an organisational network throughout the whole of Algeria which would later – 
after the party was founded – enable them to launch strong electoral campaigns and to 
mobilise large numbers of voters and sympathisers. Andrea Liverani stresses that this 
associative framework was the key to the success of the Islamist parties, as well as being 
a resource that all Algeria's political parties across the political spectrum – from the most 
secular and left-wing to the most conservative and religious – have used or attempted to 
use at some time or another to strengthen their political structures (Liverani 2008). It 
should come as no surprise that this was the same political model that was used by FLN, 
the single party which for decades was backed by the support of mass organisations (of 
women, unions, students, farmers, etc.). 
THE NATURE OF THE ISLAMIST ACTORS 
As I have made clear, the Islamist actors who are the subject of this study are 
political parties, all of them backed by associative movements of a religious nature. In the 
case of FIS, in addition to a network of charity and Islamisation, the party also had a 
union: the Islamic Workers’ Union (SIT). While FIS had an extensive network throughout 
the country that promoted the party, the Movement of the Islamic Society (HAMAS – 
later renamed the Movement of Society for Peace, or MSP) also had its own associative 
movement, called “Jamiy’at al-Irshad wa al-Islah” (the Association of Orientation and 
Reform). Al-Irshad wa al-Islah was founded in the early 1980s by Sheikh Mahfoud 
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Nahnah and Sheikh Mohamed Bouslimani.3  Meanwhile, the en-Nahda party and, later 
on, the el-Islah party also had an association, created in 1988, called Jamiy’at an-Nahda 
li-Islah az-zaqafi wa al-ijtima’i (the Association of Rebirth for Cultural and Social 
Reform). This became the party base for en-Nahda al-Islami, which later changed its 
name to en-Nahda after the new political party law of 1997 which forced parties to remove 
any religious references from their names.  
The current situation of Saad Abdellah Djaballah, the leader and founder of the 
en-Nahda movement, is also worthy of comment from a legal point of view, and because 
it is illustrative of relations between this political tendency and the regime. In 1999, 
Djaballah decided to create his own party, after having left en-Nahda because he did not 
agree with the party leadership's line on collaboration and future incorporation into the 
government. His new party was called Harakat el-Islah al-Watani, or simply el-Islah, 
though it is known by the French acronym MRN (Mouvement du Renouveau National). 
With this party, Djaballah stood for presidential elections in April 1999, ands obtained 
400,000 votes (approximately 4%). Led by Djaballah, El Islah gained good results in the 
subsequent elections (the state and local elections of 2002 and the presidential elections 
of 2004; see the Table of Results), until 2007, when the party’s leadership launched a 
surprise attack by holding an extraordinary meeting at which the security officers refused 
entry to Djaballah and his sympathisers (who numbered approximately 1,000). At this 
meeting, new directorial posts were appointed (president, general secretary, etc.), and 
Djaballah was ousted. A court validated the new leadership committee and disqualified 
Djaballah from the presidency of the party. As a result, Djaballah did not stand in the 
2009 presidential elections. In July 2011, Djaballah attempted to return to the political 
scene by creating his third party, the Front for Justice and Development  (FJD), legalised 
in 2012 with the name of al-Adala (Justice). 
In March/April 1992, FIS was dissolved as a party, and thus became illegal. The 
attempts that have been made to reconstitute it have failed, the most notable being that of 
Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, an Algerian former minister. In 1999, Ibrahimi created the Wafa 
or Wafa’ (Loyalty) party, though it was not given authorisation to operate as a party as 
most of its founding members had belonged to FIS. The Wafa’ spokesman claimed in 
reply that only 2.5 or 3.5% (according to sources) had previously been FIS members. In 
fact, it has not been made clear why an ex-member of FIS should be prevented from 
exercising his political rights and forming a party, which makes the decision a rather 
arbitrary matter (Roberts, 2003). Under Algerian law, political rights are revoked for 
anyone who has been convicted in a court, such as Abbasi Madani and ‘Ali Belhadj, the 
number 1 and 2 of FIS. After having spent 12 years in prison, the two are not allowed to 
make any public political declarations or, naturally, to form a party or engage in any other 
political activities. The FIS leadership has become divided as a result of the 
imprisonments, exile and patent tactical and strategic differences. Apart from the classic 
split between "Algerianists" and "internationalists", the party's elites were fragmented as 
their members met one of at least three different fates: some were driven into exile abroad, 
others were arrested and later freed but denied their political rights, and finally there were 
others who had returned to Algeria and were (theoretically) allowed to exercise their 
political rights. The first group included Rabah Kebir (Germany and France), Mourad 
                                                 
3 The latter was co-founder of MSP and president of the association before he was killed by the terrorist anti-Islamist group OJAL (Organisation des 
Jeunes Algériens Libres) or possibly by GIA (Armed Islamic Group, see above) in November 1993. 
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Dhina (France and Switzerland) and Anwar Haddam (EEUU), while in the second group 
there were A. Madani and A. Belhadj. Meanwhile, Abdelkader Hachani was killed shortly 
after leaving prison in 1999. The most important name in the third group was Madani 
Mezrag, the head of AIS, the armed wing of FIS, who took advantage of the first 
reconciliation initiative following the truce and break-up of AIS (1997 and 2000, 
respectively). These divisions appear to confirm that reconstituting FIS today would be 
little short of impossible, not only because of the lack of leaders, but also because the 
party has lost its grassroots support. Nevertheless, the support several of these figures 
have given to reconciliation initiatives (at least in terms of their formulation, albeit not in 
their application) and especially for the candidacy of Abdelaziz Bouteflika in 2004 
represent proof that they continue to exert a not-inconsiderable influence on Algerian 
politics.  
In view of the enforced ramifications of FIS abroad, it is important to stress that 
both the MSP and the en-Nahda movement have claimed affinity to the Muslim 
Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt. The similarities between the MSP logo and the MB anagram 
(an open Koran and a religious exhortation) are testament to this. However, it is not clear 
how far these affiliations or inspirations extend. Algerian law also prohibits all parties 
from receiving funds from abroad. Neither is it clear what ideological differences separate 
the MSP from the parties led by Djaballah (en-Nahda al-Islamiyya, el-Islah and now the 
FJD). Willis notes that, at first, en-Nahda was highly critical of neoliberal privatisation 
and policy, something that cannot be said of HAMAS-MSP. Willis and other authors have 
stressed that en-Nahda is doctrinally and tactically closer to FIS than MSP. However, this 
did not stop Djaballah and other leaders from viewing FIS as radical and opportunist. 
Perhaps the most important difference between HAMAS-MSP and the Djaballah 
movement has been their respective relations with the regime, as while the former has 
always been very close to the government, Djaballah has always upheld a stance of non-
collaboration with governments and critical support for the reconciliation process. 
Admittedly, despite this stance, Djaballah's parties (Nahda and later Islah, until 2007) 
have never refused to participate in the local administration of the country (local and 
provincial assemblies). 
POWER RESOURCES 
 
 -Ideology. The ideology of FIS can be defined as nationalist, populist and religious. It is 
this populist element that most clearly distinguishes FIS from its Islamist rivals, en-Nahda 
al-Islamiyya and HAMAS, and which furthermore enabled FIS to become a political party 
with mass support (specifically, between 33.6% and 24.5% of the electorate, depending 
on whether we take the 1990 local elections or the first round of the 1991 state elections 
as our reference). Though the percentage in votes over valid votes stood at around 50% 
in both elections, it should be borne in mind that the turnout, which was not particularly 
high, fell from 65% in 1990 to 59% in December 1991, and that FIS lost a total of 
1,070,000 votes in the two elections (Bustos 2004, 411-412).  The key moment when FIS 
revealed its populist nature was at the outbreak of the Gulf War, following the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. While the Algerian authorities attempted to mediate 
in the conflict and to maintain a balanced stance (which consisted of condemning the 
invasion at the same time as ruling out any allied intervention), FIS organised mass 
demonstrations in solidarity with Iraq. According to accounts by military leaders of the 
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time, ‘Ali Belhadj, one of the leaders of FIS, used to walk around in military attire, and 
even went so far as to meet up with the commanders-in-chief of the Algerian army dressed 
like this (Nezzar 1999). This undoubtedly rang alarm bells in military spheres, as it was 
interpreted as a direct challenge to the Algerian state and its armed forces. This stance 
broke not only with Algeria's position, but of course (and much more so) with the Arab 
states that were more conservative and inclined to support Islamism in the Persian Gulf, 
starting with Saudi Arabia. The possible loss of donations and support from these 
countries did not cause FIS to back down or moderate its discourse, nor its campaign of 
mobilisations, and this placed the Algerian government in a serious predicament, as well 
as sending out a message that did little to calm the Western media. This posture by FIS, 
which was apparently contradictory with respect to ideology but highly profitable in 
electoral terms, given that it won over the Arab ‘man in the street’, has been analysed 
from opposing stances by H. Roberts (1991, 1994) and François Burgat (1994); the former 
criticises the "misguided opportunism" of FIS, while the latter highlights the populist, 
pan-Arabist nature of the Algerian party. It goes without saying that this event also 
distanced FIS from its Islamist rivals, en-Nahda and HAMAS. The elections in December 
1991 clearly showed that the populist strategy of FIS had produced a positive result, as 
the party won 3,262,222 votes compared to the 368,697 gained by HAMAS and the 
150,093 votes (approximately) for en-Nahda al-Islamiyya. This translated into 188 seats 
for the former party, in the first round (in a parliament of 430 ministers), and none for the 
other two, whatever the results of the second round, which was called off by the Armed 
Forces.  
 
Another of the strong points of FIS was its anti-system, anti-regime discourse, 
which fiercely criticised the secular, socialist establishment of independent Algeria, in 
addition to the modernist elites and sectors with interests in Western countries, especially 
in France, and which became known as “hizb el-França”, or "French party". This 
antiestablishment discourse, which discredited an entire political, economic and cultural 
system, resonated profoundly with the poorer sectors, the urban populations that had 
become declassed, marginalised and non-integrated. The over-simplifying discourse was 
attractive to many frustrated young people whose expectations had been let down by 
independent Algeria, in spite of all the revolutionary rhetoric about equality and 
development. The tone and political stance also set FIS apart from its Islamist rivals, who 
were much more restrained and moderate in their criticism of the regime and in their 
solutions to Algeria's problems. 
 
- Funding of the Islamist parties (in the case of FIS, until it was declared illegal and 
dissolved in 1992) came from public subsidies, the dues paid by their party members and, 
especially, from donations and economic activities generated by the religious and aid 
associations associated with the party. There may have been other sources of income, 
such as donors from abroad, though this was expressly prohibited by Algerian law (art. 
56, Party Law 12-04 of 12 January 2012 and art.191 of the Electoral Law 16-10 of 25 
August 2016). In particular, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and donors in Saudi Arabia 
and the Persian Gulf may have funded HAMAS-MSP and the en-Nahda movement, as 
both parties were very close to the Brotherhood. As I mentioned previously, this channel 
of funding was blocked for FIS after the Iraq War (1991). 
 
 
TABLE OF RESULTS OF ISLAMIST PARTIES AND CANDIDATES IN THE ALGERIAN PLURALISTIC ELECTIONS (1990-2016) 
 Local 
1990 
Parliam
1991 *1 
Presid. 
1995 
Parliam 
1997 
Local 
1997 
Presid. 
1999 *6 
Parliam 
2002 
Local 
2002 
Presid. 
2004 
Parliam 
2007 
Local 
2007 
Presid. 
2009 
Parliam. 
2012 
Presid. 2014 
 
FIS 54.2% 47.2% ILLEGAL ILLEGAL 
ILLEGA
L ILLEGAL ILLEGAL 
ILLEG
AL ILLEGAL 
ILLEGA
L ILLEGAL 
ILLEGA
L 
 
ILLEGAL 
 
ILLEGAL 
MSP 
ex MSI 
(Hamas) 
DID NOT 
EXIST 3.0% 
25.0% 
(Nahnah) 14.80% 9.3% 
NO PRES. 
CAND. 7.7% 7.4% 
NO PRES. 
CAND. 9.6% 12.6% 
NO 
PRES. 
CAND 
ALLIANCE  
ALGÉRIE 
VERTE 
6.22% 
BOYCOTT 
 
en-Nahda 
(Mouvement 
en-Nahda, 
MN)  
DID NOT 
EXIST 2.0% 
NO PRES 
CAND 8.70% 3.8% 
NO PRES. 
CAND.*3 0.6% 0.4% 
NO PRES. 
CAND. 2.5% 2.2% 
NO 
PRES. 
CAND 
ALLIANCE 
ALGÉRIE 
VERTE 
6.22% 
BOYCOTT 
 
el-Islah 
(Mouvement 
pour la 
Réforme 
Nationale, 
MRN) 
 
DID NOT 
EXIST 
DID 
NOT 
EXIST 
DID NOT 
EXIST 
DID NOT 
EXIST 
DID 
NOT 
EXIST 
4%  
(Djaballah 
*2 ) 
10.0% 9.3% 5% (Djaballah) 3.4% 2.2% 
1.4% 
(Younsi) 
ALLIANCE 
ALGÉRIE 
VERTE 
6.22% 
SUPPORTED 
ALI BENFLIS 
Ahmed Taleb 
Ibrahimi      
12.53%  
4*   
CAND. 
REJECTE
D 
  
NO 
PRES. 
CAND. 
 NO PRES. CAND. 
Mohamed 
Said Belaid *5            0.9%  
NO PRES. 
CAND. 
Total: 54.2% 52.2% 25.0% 23.5% 13.1% 16.5% 18.3% 17.1% 5.0% 15.5% 17.0% 2.3% 6.2% 0% 
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 RISING PHASE (AVERAGE 38.75% 
) 
INTERMEDIATE PHASE 
 (AVERAGE  16.25%) 
DOWNWARD PHASE (AVERAGE 7.66%) 
  Notes: Table produced by the author based on his own work and other sources. In the local elections (dual in Algeria, for both municipalities and provinces or wilayas), only the 
percentage of the votes obtained in the municipal elections is given. 
  *1:  Only the first round; the second was cancelled.  
  *2: Djaballah who had run as secretary general in 1999 and 2004 was expelled by the party leadership and could not stand for presidential elections in 2009; Yahid Djounsi did so, 
standing for the el-Islah party. 
  *3: Mahfoud Nahnah was disqualified as a presidential candidate in 1999 for not having fought in the war of independence despite the fact that he was born after 1942 (27 January 
of that year), a condition that would normally have made him exempt from the requirement of having participated in the war.  
  *4: Ibrahimi's candidacy was turned down the coast he was 1,000 signatures short of the required 75,000; however, Ibrahimi claimed that he had submitted 94,000 (Le Quotidien 
d'Oran, 8 March 2004). 
  *5: Mohamed Said Belaid collaborated with Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi in the 1999 elections, though he opted not to stand after failing in his bid to legalise his Wafa' party. Not to be 
confused with Mohamed Said, member of FIS and creator of a terrorist group, FIDA 
  *6: Less than 24 hours before the election, the 6 opposition candidates withdrew from the poll on fraud allegations; however their ballots were kept, used and counted.  
Political parties are not allowed to carry out business activities. Meanwhile, associations 
cannot (in theory) maintain "organic or structural relations" with political parties, "nor receive 
funds from them or finance them" (art. 11 of the Associations Law 90-31 of 4/12/1990), and 
parties cannot maintain relations that are "organic, involving loyalty or dependence with unions 
or associations", nor "become the section or delegation of a foreign organisation" (arts. 50 and 
51 of the 2012 Party Law, respectively). However, in practice, many political parties have 
maintained close relations with associations and organisations from civil society, including 
unions, and the Islamist parties are no exception.  
 
Thus, the Algerian Law is highly restrictive with respect to the funding of parties and 
links with national or foreign organisations, though it is much less strict in practice. The 
ordinary sources permitted are private donations with a maximum of 300 times the minimum 
guaranteed salary (for each annual donation), and state subsidies through MPs with seats in the 
National Assembly. This leaves the door open for informal practices linked with aid and 
religious activities. 
 
The new Associations Law of 5-12 of 6 January 2012 abrogating the former, despite 
some concessions, reinforced existing restrictions on all associations and foresaw a specific 
regime for religious associations. The Law repeated that associations cannot establish links with 
political parties and should abstain from foreign intervention. Under the projected regulation, 
religious association must undertake a separate registration process and “respect national unity 
and the prevailing religious creed of Algerian society”.4   
   
- Religious and charity associations. If there is one phenomenon that has characterised 
Algeria's religious panorama since independence arrived in 1962, it is the non-stop building of 
mosques throughout the country, which has continued to the present day5. This growth was 
exponential, owing in part to public initiative but especially to private funding. The law 
concerning mosques included a major grey area that enabled Islamists of all tendencies to 
occupy many places of worship. The law envisaged the naming of an official imam "once the 
mosque has been completed". But as these were private initiatives, the builders would leave the 
work unfinished, and their promoters could employ an imam of their own choice (Rouadjia 
1990). This became one of the main loopholes for radical imams, though it was also strongly 
encouraged by the fact that the country was lacking in sufficient numbers of qualified imams 
for all the new mosques being built. This meant that many imams arrived from the Middle East; 
men whose ideas and experiences had little or nothing in common with the reality of Algeria, 
which had experienced an intense, traumatic contact with the West, as well as with socialism 
and secularism. 
 
As for the contributions and membership fees paid by the members of religious associations, it 
is hard to gain reliable data on this subject. One of our few sources is Chemine Slimane, the 
MSP director of communications and one-time member of Jamiat al-Irshad wa al-Islah. In an 
interview with Andrea Liverani, he claimed that the association had reached a total of 20,000 
                                                 
4 Le Quotidien d’Oran, 07/11/2015. 
5 In 1962, the number of mosques in Algeria was very low, as many of them were turned into churches or warehouses, but since then they have increased at a 
dizzying rate – 6,000 in 1986, 15,000 in 2006, 17,000 in 2013 and possibly 20,000 in 2016, according to data from Algeria's minister of religious affairs (Algerie-
Focus 15/11/2013 and Ouest Tribune 6/04/2015). At the same time, associations with religious ends have also increased in number, and represent a considerable 
proportion of the 11,000 associations created between 1971 and 1987, Ahmed Rouadjia, Les frères et la mosquée. Enquête sur le mouvement islamiste en Algérie 
(Paris: Karthala, 1990), 78-92. In fact, Andrea Liverani affirmed there were 11,000 religious associations in Algeria (2008: 20). Since 2013 a specific Law on 
Religious Associations has been debated but not yet adopted;  the number of registered associations according to the minister of interior were 15,790 over 
96,144 associations of all types (Le Quotidien d’Oran, 11/05/2013). 
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militant activists and 240,000 members by the early 1990s, but by 2001 (when the interview 
took place) these figures had fallen significantly, as a result of the violence (two presidents 
murdered, among other attacks) that forced the party to reduce its activities in many parts of the 
country. Chemine Slimane acknowledged that even though membership numbers were 
gradually returning to normal, many members viewed the party with scepticism, as it drained 
the association of funds and qualified personnel (Liverani 2008). 
 
In tandem with the building of the mosques, a large network of religious and charity 
associations was also developed. The former were responsible for supervising the building of 
mosques and organising pilgrimages, while the latter became increasingly important from the 
1980s onwards, when the socialist state began to suffer from the effects of the 1986 oil crisis. 
Austerity policies on public spending began to leave more and more room for civil society to 
operate, in many cases, in the form of Islamic charity organisations. This explains why, when 
the first free open elections were held (1990-91), some parties were already backed by an 
associative network which gave them a huge advantage over the new political parties, especially 
those of a secular nature, with the exception of those with regional and/or ethnic grassroots 
support (Kabyles). 
 
In the Islamic world, making private donations to building mosques is a highly 
prestigious, moral and social act. It is a voluntary action that demonstrates the donor’s wealth, 
but above all his generosity and religiousness. It is often an act that purifies the donor and makes 
his fortune socially acceptable. It was specifically this channel of funding that brought about 
the enormous expansion of the associative fabric and mosque-building throughout the country. 
This channel is one of the most important indirect sources of funding for Islamist parties. The 
only difference between the three parties is that FIS possessed an extraordinary ability to weave 
a network of associations throughout the country by making a rather dubious, even aggressive 
use of the mosques (Leverrier 1995), while the en-Nahda movement always had support that 
was much more regionally limited to the east of the country. Apart from FIS, only HAMAS-
MSP (which suffered from the same problem of regional isolation – in the central region of 
Blida) managed to gradually extend its networks throughout the country, as was demonstrated 
by the more than 1 million votes the party gained in several elections, and the geographical 
distribution of these votes.  
 
-Potential for mobilising grassroots. The potential that FIS possessed for linear or 
revolutionary mobilisation derived not only from its nation-wide fabric of associations, but just 
as much (or more) from its radical populist discourse, which spoke directly to millions of people 
who felt disinherited and frustrated by the system. In this respect, it was the only one of the 
three Islamist parties with a potential for linear mobilisation. Both HAMAS-MSP and en-Nahda 
always adopted circular relations, with clientelistic milieus that were more or less 
geographically circumscribed, and with the aim of advancing the positions and elitist interests 
of their leaders. That is the way they have been perceived to date, and it helps to explain why 
that they reached an electoral maximum that they have been unable to surpass (see Table of 
Electoral Results). This proximity to power which characterises both parties (MSP and en-
Nahda, as well as el-Islah when Djaballah departed) has caused strong internal tensions, 
however. Particularly when presidential elections are approaching, the division becomes 
apparent between those who think they shouldn’t present a rival candidate to Bouteflika (and 
who are hoping to gain power on his ticket), and those who do want to submit their own 
candidates. The consequences of such friction have tended to be schisms, desertions and often 
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a drop in vote and seat numbers in the subsequent elections. In fact, MSP experienced this crisis 
in 2009, when Abdelmajid Menasra and a group of dissident leaders left MSP to form their own 
party, the Movement for Preaching and Change (MPC), specifically as a result of this type of 
disagreements. This all goes to show that these parties exist in an orbit of circular power 
relations, though the disaffections and schisms also show the attempts made by grassroots 
members to escape from this dynamic, not to mention the regime’s attempts to weaken 
structures that it considers to be too autonomous.  
 
 
TYPES OF ACTION AND STRATEGIES WITH RESPECT TO THE REGIME 
 
Types of action. 
Commencing with FIS, it is clear that the party's actions have been mainly proactive – making 
decisions and taking the initiative at all times. A clear example of this was when the party 
declared an indefinite strike and an occupation of public spaces in Algiers in April 1991 with 
the aim of forcing the government to withdraw the new electoral law with which it was 
attempting to halt the political progress made by FIS. In contrast, MSP and the en-Nahda 
movement have typically been reactive in their actions, both to the regime’s initiatives and to 
relations between FIS and the authorities.  
 
With respect to violence, it is true that a large number of tendencies and factions have 
gravitated around FIS; these groups have been essentially peaceful, though there have been 
some violent elements. Even before the outbreak of the violence in 1992, a violent episode took 
place that would be an unfortunate premonition of what came about later. Leaving to one side 
the terrible events of October 1988 (riots in the main cities, with soldiers shooting into crowds), 
the final stage of which saw the Islamist militants of FIS taking part, the first outbreak of 
violence was an attack on the barracks of the gendarmerie in Guemmar (el-Oued), in November 
1991. During this attack, the armed group Takfir wa al-Hijra (Excommunication and Exodus) 
killed several soldiers and appropriated Army weaponry. Admittedly, this group was made up 
of "Afghans" – ex-combatants from the war in Afghanistan who did not have any links with 
FIS, beyond that of belonging to the nebulous world of Algerian Islamism. In fact, in the same 
year, following the arrest of the number 1 and 2 of FIS, the provisional leaders (headed by 
Abdelqader Hachani) decided to expel Maylis esh-Shura a Said Mekhloufi, the party's head of 
security, because he had openly declared himself to be in favour of direct action; that is to say, 
violent action.  
 
To a large extent, FIS was a victim of its own ambition and of the way in which it was 
manipulated by different sectors of the regime. After 1992, all the leaders who had not been 
imprisoned or convicted (the Historic Seven at the July trial6) escaped into exile or went 
underground. Though they did not opt immediately for the path of armed struggle (unlike other 
groups, including MEI, MIA, GIA), they finally did so in 1994 following the creation of the 
AIS, the armed wing of FIS. After the failed attempt of the Sant’Egidio Platform (1995), the 
AIS entered into negotiations with the Algerian army, which led to the group's dismantling and 
subsequent break-up (2000). The leaders of FIS (such as their number 5, Abdelqader 
                                                 
6 Abbasi Madani, Ali Belhadj (Benhadj), Kamal Gemazi, Ali Yeddi, Abdelkader Boukhamkham, Omar Abdelkader and Nouredin Chigara were the seven leaders 
that were all sentenced to jail terms of between four and 12 years at the military court held in July 1992, a court that has been questioned in terms of its legality. 
Only the first two served their full terms (12 years) though they were temporarily released to facilitate negotiations; the others were freed in September 1994  
Martin Stone, The Agony of Algeria (London: Hurst & Company, 1997); Hugh Roberts, The Battlefield of Algeria (1988-1992). Studies in a Broken Polity (London: 
Verso, 2003). 
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Boukhamkham) and AIS always condemned the violence carried out in their name by other 
Islamist groups and guerrillas (GIA, GSPC, AQMI), and denied that they represented FIS in 
any shape or form. In any case, the tendency of FIS was to act in isolation, and to refuse to join 
existing Islamist parties, whether it was HAMAS or en-Nahda al-Islamiyya. FIS only agreed to 
become part of the Rabitat ad-daw’a on the understanding that it was a flexible, non-
constricting framework. 
 
The actions of HAMAS-MSP and the en-Nahda movement have always been peaceful; 
they condemned the radical stance of FIS, instead championing the channels of politics and 
negotiation. For various reasons and different personal links, En-Nahda has always been closer 
to FIS than HAMAS has, and has attempted to find a national solution to the illegalisation of 
the former party. There has been regular contact between the two parties, as well as attempts 
by en-Nahda at mediation and even at reinstating the leaders of FIS, despite the existing legal 
limitations. Both of the legal Islamist parties have maintained cooperative relations with the 
government, especially HAMAS-MSP. This party has had ministers in every Algerian 
government since the 1997 state elections7, including such names as Bouguerra Soltani 
(minister for SMEs and later for Labour) and Amar Ghoul (minister for Fisheries and Public 
Works). Furthermore, the party is a member of the Presidential Alliance, which was formed in 
1999 and since then has supported the candidacy of Abdelaziz Bouteflika in all the presidential 
elections. On the basis of this alliance, the MSP has meetings with the other governing parties 
(FLN and RND), provides ministers for government and refrains from presenting its own 
candidate for the presidential elections. Djaballah's parties have never held governmental posts, 
nor have they supported Bouteflika, but they have held seats in parliament, the senate and in 
local and provincial assemblies. In contrast, following the departure of Djaballah (1999), en-
Nahda has participated in government, in the form of the minister Abdelwahab Derbal. As a 
reward, Lahbib Adami, the ex-Secretary General of the party, was appointed ambassador for 
Algeria in Saudi Arabia, while Derbal, when his mandate ended, was appointed ambassador for 
Algeria to the Arab League (Sfeir 2009).  
                 
 
Strategies 
In light of the above, it is obvious that of the three parties, HAMAS-MSP had the clearest, most 
stable strategy, which could be described simply as loyalty to the regime. It has unquestionably 
been the Islamist party with the closest relation with the authorities, and it probably was so even 
before the founding of the party, when Chadli Bendjedid, the president at that time, decided to 
give a reprieve to Mahfoud Nahnah, who was serving his sentence in prison. As I have described 
previously, the strategy of FIS has fluctuated between covert confrontation (until March 1992 
or even 1994, when AIS was created) and open or declared confrontation. Admittedly, however, 
FIS has often shown signs of moderation, such as when it presented itself for election in 1991, 
in spite of the fact that all its leaders were imprisoned, or when it joined other parties in signing 
the Sant’Egidio Platform for Peace in 1995. FIS was quite clearly unable to control or stop the 
spiral of violence and the emergence of armed groups that used increasingly radical methods, 
which began with breaking the taboo of attacking civilians (GIA, MEI, FIDA), then attacking 
foreigners (GSPC) and finally using suicide bombers to spread panic and cause great 
destruction (AQMI).  
 
                                                 
7 Previously he was Secretary of State for Fisheries in the government of Ahmed Ouyahia, formed in December 1995. 
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The strategy of the en-Nahda movement has also been essentially ambivalent, opting 
(depending on its leaders at the time) for critical support of reconciliation policies, including 
support for their promoter, President Bouteflika, or for more thorough criticism of the way these 
policies were applied, the continuation of authoritarianism and the government's neoliberal 
policies (in line with Djaballah's opinions). In practical terms, this strategy has fluctuated 
between non-confrontation (passivity and entryism into the government) and covert 
confrontation, marked by the party's refusal to allow itself to be co-opted. While the passive 
strategy of non-confrontation resulted in access to ministries and embassies (en-Nahda from 
1999 onwards), the strategy of strong opposition and not allowing one's party to be co-opted (a 
feature of Djaballah's parties) resulted in these parties being infiltrated, "divided" by 
administrative or judicial intervention and gradually weakened in Parliament (see Table of 
Results). 
CIRCULAR OR LINEAR POWER RELATIONS  
As we have already seen from its relations with the regime, FIS has been the only one 
of the three Islamist parties and movements with a potential for mobilising its grassroots 
support. Though, on the occasion of the reform of the Family Code (Personal Statute) in 2005, 
there was a considerable amount of Islamist mobilisation to call for the Statute to maintain its 
conservative nature based on a restrictive interpretation of the shariy’a, this can only be 
considered an exception to the dominant trend. This was an exception because, furthermore, it 
touched on the central nucleus of the Islamist parties’ ideological programmes – the family. 
Leaving this event to one side (and which, in any case, was not aimed at advancing the interests 
of a specific group, but at preventing the emancipation of women in a secular, progressive 
sense8), neither MSP nor the en-Nahda-el-Islah movement can be said to have mobilised their 
grassroots supporters to achieve social or political objectives that would have benefited the 
social strata they claim to represent.  
As for FIS, the potential for mobilisation and, therefore, for linear power relations that 
the party enjoyed for several years was not made suitable use of, and the maximalism of the 
party's leaders brought about the collapse of the party, its leaders and the associations that 
supported them, all of which were vigorously dismantled and repressed. The mobilisations 
organised by FIS in the years 1988-91 were mostly for the purpose of defending the popular 
objectives that the party claimed to embody. Nevertheless, the hazardous trial of strength that 
FIS embarked upon led to the party being manipulated by the regime and losing control of the 
situation, a circumstance that objectively separated the party from its sympathisers. The 
outbreak of violence cannot logically be considered to be something that was desired by the 
grassroots supporters of FIS, nor by Algerian society, apart from the suffering and enormous 
cost that it represented for society as a whole. The participation of FIS in the events of October, 
with the resulting death toll, represented a demonstration against the system and a demand for 
urgent change in the country. Some leaders of FIS, such as Ali Belhaj, who had participated in 
the demonstrations, met with the authorities in the days that followed to discuss responsibility 
for the deaths and changes in the country. Many of these changes were introduced the following 
year, with the new constitution, the abandonment of socialism, multi-party elections, etc. This 
did not mean, however, that the so-called Algerian "reformers" were applying the programme 
                                                 
8 It should be noted that most of the progressive and feminist media called for the government to go beyond this timid reform and to completely repeal the 
reactionary Family Code of 1984. 
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or the wishes of the Islamist movement; they applied their own programme, though clearly it 
coincided in part with the interests and objectives of the Islamist movement.  
The campaign against the Iraq war and in solidarity with Iraq organised by FIS in early 
1991 reflected popular feeling but did not truly seek either to impose this viewpoint on the 
government (which was politically unrealistic and highly risky) or to call its electors’ attention 
to the radical nature of its proposals and to set a distance between itself and FLN and the 
government. In this respect, the request FIS made to the Algerian government that it should 
send FIS volunteers to defend the Iraqi people can be interpreted more as a populist, electoral 
manoeuvre than as a true expression of the interests of the Algerian people.  
Finally, the episode of the indefinite strike and the occupation of squares in protest 
against the Electoral Law of April 1991 was an attempt to ensure that FIS was not denied victory 
(as had been the case a year earlier) in the local elections. Though the objective can be 
considered legitimate and a reflection of popular feeling, the pressure exerted on what was a 
weak government in the middle of a process of transition and change only created more tension 
and forced the Army to intervene in the administration of the political process. The maximalism 
of the leaders of FIS – which at that time was governing over half of the country's town councils 
– did not chime well with the interests of the social classes that the party represented. In any 
event, it was a risky gamble that led to the arrest of the party's two main leaders and the creation 
of a climate of pre-violence that was marked by the attack on Guemmar gendarmerie. This 
radicalisation, tempered by the stance taken by the new provisional government to participate 
in the elections, ended up by alienating many citizens at the polls. Turnout dropped by 6% 
compared with the previous year, and FIS lost 1,074,000 votes throughout the country (Bustos 
2004). Worse still, it all served to create a climate of alarm and fear which precipitated the 
mobilising of not only the Army, but also pressure from the country's secular sectors, women's 
associations, the sole ex-union and the international media to call off the second round of the 
elections.   
These three episodes clearly show that the leaders of FIS chose to make use of the 
party’s influence and its capacity for popular mobilisation in order to negotiate face-to-face 
with the regime. Driven on by this desire, FIS as a party sought maximalist gains that would 
directly benefit the political organisation, but not the interests of its grassroots supporters. 
Empowered by the apparent success of the events of October 1988 and the resulting political 
openness, the party felt confident enough to pressure the regime into granting it concessions by 
bringing the masses out onto the streets. But it was specifically here that the party made its 
mistake, as the tactic brought a rapid reaction from the Army and from many secular, 
progressive circles, as well as creating a dangerous tension that alienated voters in general and 
the party's sympathisers in particular. On these and other occasions, FIS chose to act alone, 
setting itself apart from other political parties (except for the case of the negotiations for the 
Sant’Egidio Platform of 1995), either out of a fear of infiltration by the state or from a belief 
that the party's true strength lay in acting alone. In all these cases, FIS could have upheld the 
interests of its grassroots supporters better by seeking synergies and support from other parties, 
but unfortunately it did not do so, and the party only realised its mistake and tried to rectify it 
in 1995, by which time the conflict was unstoppable because other, more radical groups had 
come onto the scene who did not adhere to the same political way of thinking.  
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CONCLUSIONS  
In this piece I have carried out a fundamental study of the most recent Islamist political 
parties (FIS, en-Nahda and MSP-HAMAS), touching only briefly on the armed Islamist groups, 
as they are not considered politically important elites. I have attempted to show that these 
parties, just like the rest of Algerian society, have used and continue to find support in 
associative networks. In the case of Islamist parties, these networks are much denser and more 
extensive than those of other, secular parties. This has been caused by sociological reasons, 
combined with the exponential growth of mosques and the social prestige gained by making 
donations for religious ends. Both MSP-HAMAS and en-Nahda al Islamiyya were created on 
the foundations of Islamic religious and charity associations (Jamiy’at el-Irshad wa al-Islah 
and al Jamiy’at en-Nahda li-Islah az-zaqafi wa al-iytima’i). While it was a legal party, FIS was 
supported by a network that was less centralised but much more widely spread, and which broke 
through all regional limits or those based on clientelistic fiefdoms. The fundamental features in 
these networks were the mosques and the party’s populist, radical discourse, which was easily 
accessible and direct in its criticism of the regime, unlike that of its Islamist rivals, MSP and 
en-Nahda al-Islamiyya. 
Following the illegalising and dismantling of FIS, HAMAS-MSP and en-Nahda al-
Islamiyya embarked on different political strategies to try and take advantage of the enormous 
power vacuum left by FIS. While the MSP’s strategy clearly adhered to a policy of loyalty, 
cooperating closely with the regime and forming part of the governmental coalitions and the 
"presidential alliance" that supported the president Abdelaziz Bouteflika, en-Nahda fragmented 
into at least three parties (en-Nahda, el-Islah and Abdellah Djaballah's FJD), specifically as a 
result of its vacillating between following a strategy of non-confrontation with the regime, 
leading to its co-opting and a strategy of covert confrontation, opposed to making concessions 
or entering into the dynamic of the system. These strategies, which are framed within secular 
power relations, explain why none of these legal parties has, to date, succeeded in filling the 
hole left by FIS; in fact, not only have they failed to reach electoral representation figures 
similar to those of FIS, furthermore (as the Table of Results shows) they have experienced a 
marked downward trend. This has led some authors to speak of "the failure of the political 
participation of Islamism"9 (Boubekeur 2010). However, it is significant that almost 20 years 
after the FIS was declared illegal, another amnesty was declared in 2012 for more than 7,000 
Islamist prisoners (mostly from FIS-AIS) who were jailed for non-violent crimes.10 
Nevertheless, the eventual return of FIS politicians or the lift of the ban on the party should not 
be overemphasized, since it is a recurrent theme that has never been materialized. 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
9 In fact, in the 2012 legislative elections, despite the fact that three major Islamist parties stood together in an Alliance (the MSP, en-Nahda and Islah), they 
were not able to surpass (6,2%) the sum of their individual scores in former polls, over 15% (see Table of Results), provoking an immediate accusation of fraud.  
10 See, for example, the office of Europa Press, “Bouteflika considers freeing Algerian Islamists imprisoned since the 1990s”, 16 May 2011, or the report by Isabelle 
Mandraud that appeared in Le Monde on 24 May 2011 under the title “Algérie: Le FIS négocie son retour en politique” Isabel Mandraud, "Are Algeria’s Islamists 
Ready To Make A Political Comeback?," Le Monde 2011. 
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